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Mr. Fordham stands by his legal analysis, and its application to the 
instant dispute, that is set forth in his Opening Brief. He seeks to refrain from 
unnecessarily repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which he 
remains confident, that appear in that Brief. 
I. MR. OLDROYD HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE 
"FIREMAN'S RULE" IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH THE 
DISTRICT COURT COULD CONCEIVABLY HAVE GRANTED 
HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HAS FAILED 
TO COUNTER IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF MR. FORDHAM'S 
ARGUMENT. 
Mr. Oldroyd has in his Brief acknowledged that the only conceivable 
basis for the District Court's granting him summary judgment and refusing to 
allow this case to go to trial is application of the "Fireman's Rule." 
Mr. Oldroyd has also failed satisfactorily to counter important aspects of 
the argument set forth in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief, including the following: 
the proposition that application of the Fireman's Rule runs afoul of the Utah 
statutory scheme; the proposition that application of the Fireman's Rule runs 
afoul of the fundamental principle of Utah tort law that each person whose 
negligence proximately contributes to an injury should bear his proportionate 
share of fault for his conduct and pay his proportionate share of damages 
caused by his conduct; the proposition that application of the Fireman's Rule 
unfairly discriminates against Utah public safety officers; the proposition that 
the original basis of the Fireman's Rule is not applicable to the facts of this 
case; and (implicitly), by acknowledging (at p. 11 of his Brief) that the 
Fireman's Rule does not work to bar Mr. Fordham's claim against the driver 
whose vehicle struck him,1 the proposition that the Fireman's Rule is logically 
and legally inconsistent. 
The Court may fairly infer that Mr. Oldroyd's failure satisfactorily to 
respond to these contentions is not as a result of lack of thoroughness on his 
counsel's part but based on the fact that no good arguments can be made 
against them. 
II. MR. OLDROYD INCORRECTLY SUGGESTS THAT THE 
FIREMAN'S RULE APPLIES ONLY TO CLAIMS OF PEACE 
OFFICERS WHO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR 
ASSISTANCE BY PEOPLE SUCH AS MR. OLDROYD. 
Near the conclusion of his Brief, at 12, Mr. Oldroyd contends: 
The [Fireman's] Rule recognizes that citizens should be free to summon 
help from professional rescuers without concern that they might later be 
sued by the public safety officer if he or she happens to be injured while 
confronting a hazard in the course and scope of his or her employment. 
To hold otherwise could constitute a [deterrent] to citizens summoning 
help when in need and would essentially create a double recovery for 
1
 As explained in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief at 18-20, the supposed 
philosophical underpinnings of the Fireman's Rule - including the notion that 
public safety officers are paid to encounter risks in the course of their 
employment - should, if consistently applied, prevent public safety officers 
from pursuing claims against anyone whose negligence causes them to be 
injured - not only those whose antecedent negligence causes them to be at a 
given scene, but also those whose negligence injures them while they are at 
the scene. 
2 
public safety officers injured in the course of their employment while 
receiving compensation for doing their jobs.2 
The fact of the matter is that the Fireman's Rule, in its broadest 
application urged by Mr. Oldroyd, would work to prevent Mr. Fordham from 
recovering against Mr. Oldroyd regardless of whether Mr. Oldroyd himself 
made a "911" call or otherwise summoned aid. According to Mr. Oldroyd's 
overall position, the Fireman's Rule would prevent Mr. Fordham from 
recovering damages from Mr. Oldroyd regardless of whether someone else 
reported Mr. Oldroyd's own rollover incident and regardless of whether 
Mr. Fordham had just happened upon the scene.3 
It is also worthy of note that the Fireman's Rule would not prohibit claims 
of, for example (this is but one example of the discriminatory nature of the 
Rule), ambulance personnel and paramedics responding to accident scenes 
caused by the negligence of people such as Mr. Oldroyd if such emergency 
2
 For reasons explained in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief, at 12-13, the 
reference to "double recovery" in the final sentence of this excerpt from 
Mr. Oldroyd's Brief should be given no significant consideration. For a basic 
rule of Utah law (see Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-106) is that people injured while 
doing their jobs have the statutory right, even though they receive workers 
compensation benefits, to pursue claims against those whose negligence has 
caused them to sustain damages. 
3
 Indeed, in this case, it was someone else (an occupant of a vehicle that was 
already at the scene), and not Mr. Oldroyd, who made the "911" call. R. 62-
63. 
3 
responders should happen to be struck by vehicles such as the vehicle driven 
by the person who struck Mr. Fordham. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT BE PERSUADED BY THE MERE 
FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS HEW TO 
THE FIREMAN'S RULE, GENERALLY OR AS APPLIED TO 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Mr. Oldroyd relies heavily on the proposition that the majority of 
jurisdictions still, apparently, cling to the Fireman's Rule. This Court is, of 
course, not bound by the case law of other jurisdictions. This Court should 
look at relevant policy considerations, the discriminatory nature of the Rule, its 
lack of consistent application, and the fact that basic principles of established 
Utah tort common and statutory law are not necessarily parts of the law of the 
states that have adopted and still apply the Rule. Applying the Fireman's Rule 
to Mr. Fordham's claim simply on the basis of a "head count" of decisions from 
around the country is not intellectually or legally satisfying. 
IV. OTHER JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN ADDITION TO 
THOSE CITED AND DISCUSSED IN MR. FORDHAM'S 
OPENING BRIEF, AS WELL AS COGENT ANALYSES BY 
VARIOUS COMMENTATORS, SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION 
THAT THE FIREMAN'S RULE, GENERALLY OR AS APPLIED 
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SHOULD NOT WORK TO 
PREVENT MR. FORDHAM FROM PRESENTING HIS CASE 
AGAINST Mr. OLDROYD TO A JURY. 
In Wills v. Bath Excavating & Constr. Co., 829 P.2d 405, 409 (Colo. App. 
1991), the Colorado Court of Appeals explained: 
4 
We agree with the Banvai [799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990), a case 
discussed in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief at 15-16] analysis that, while 
a public safety officer's special skills, training, and experience may be 
considered with reference to any comparative negligence involved, a per 
se grant of immunity to those whose negligence created a dangerous 
situation for the officer is unwarranted. In consequence, we conclude 
that the fireman's rule is no longer the law in Colorado. 
The doctrine of assumption of risk is the law in Colorado and poses a 
question for the trier of fact. And, while not a complete bar to recovery, 
the assumption of risk is to be considered by the trier of fact in 
apportioning negligence. [Citation omitted.] Further because 
assumption of risk is a question for the trier of fact, it may not be 
decided on summary judgment. [Citation omitted.] 
Finally, we are not unmindful of the worthwhile public policy 
considerations which have given rise to the fireman's rule. We are also 
aware of the widespread, albeit often restricted, adoption of the principle 
in other jurisdictions. However we leave to the General Assembly any 
assignment of legal acceptance of the negligence of others to firemen, 
policemen, or any other public safety officers. 
The judgment [in favor of entities similarly situated to Mr. Oldroyd] is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial. 
In Court v. Grzelinski. 379 N.E.2d 281, 285 (III. 1978), the Illinois 
Supreme Court held: 
... to the extent a fireman is a person to whom injury from [a] product 
may reasonably be foreseen, he may recover in products liability, even 
though his injury was incurred while fighting a fire in the course of his 
employment. In so holding, we reject the opportunity to extend the 
"fireman's rule" beyond its limited context of landowner/occupier liability. 
Also, in an insightful dissent, in Walters v. Sloan. 571 P.2d 609, 20 
Cal.3d 199, 212-13 (Cal. 1977), Acting Chief Justice Tobriner wrote: 
5 
Proponents of the fireman's rule argue most frequently that it is the 
fireman's job to extinguish fires and the policeman's job to make arrests. 
They conclude that a fireman or policeman can base no tort claim upon 
damage caused by the very risk that he is paid to encounter and with 
which he is trained to cope. The argument, in essence, is that the 
fireman or policeman, in accepting the salary and fringe benefits offered 
for his job, assumes all normal risks inherent in his employment as a 
matter of law, and thus may not recover from one who negligently 
creates such a risk. [Citations omitted.] 
The fallacy in this argument is simply that it proves too much. Under 
this analysis an employee would routinely be barred from bringing a tort 
action whenever an injury he suffers at the hands of a negligent 
tortfeasor could be characterized as a normal inherent risk of his 
employment. Yet, as noted above, past California cases have regularly 
permitted highway workers - whose jobs obviously subject them to the 
"inherent risk" of being injured by a negligent driver — to recover for 
damages inflicted by such third party negligence [citation omitted] and 
have permitted construction workers - whose employment poses 
numerous risks of injury at the hands of another - to recover tort 
damages for work-related injuries so long as the negligent tortfeasor is 
not their employer. [Citation omitted.] 
As these and countless other cases demonstrate, while policemen and 
firemen regularly face substantial hazards in the course of their 
employment and are, theoretically at least, compensated for such risks, 
a host of other employees - highway repairmen, highrise construction 
workers, utility repairmen and the like - frequently encounter 
comparable risks in performing their jobs and, again theoretically, also 
receive compensation for such risks. California decisions have never 
perceived such theoretical compensation as a sufficient basis for barring 
the employee's cause of action against a negligent tortfeasor. 
The author of Case Note: Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Company --
Arkansas Adopts the Fireman's Rule: Do Volunteer Firefighters Get Burned 
Twice?. 50 Ark. L. Rev. 363, 374-75 (1997), wrote: 
6 
By denying a public safety officer recovery from a negligent tortfeasor 
the officer is not directed to recover his damages from the general 
public; rather the officer is totally precluded from recovering these 
damages from anyone. Contrast this with other public employees who 
are injured when confronting dangers on their jobs. The latter can 
recover workers' compensation and salary benefits from the public, but 
are also allowed additional tort damages from the third-party tortfeasors. 
Under the "fireman's rule" the injured public safety officer must bear a 
loss which other public employees are not required to bear. 
The author of Note: Equal Protection and the Fireman's Rule in Ohio, 
38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 123, 144 (1988), wrote: 
The common law governing the suits of firemen and policemen against 
tortfeasors for personal injury damages is in need of a complete 
restructuring. The most traditional fireman's rule bars firemen from 
recovery for injuries directly resulting from a fire and categorize them as 
licensees in their suits against landowners for injury resulting from the 
negligent maintenance of their property. The Ohio courts have not 
modernized, or indeed even altered to any extent, this rule since its 
creation, and the landowner's duty system upon which it is based is 
outdated. 
The determination of whether firemen and policemen can recover for 
their injuries should depend instead, upon the presence of fault, the 
basis of all tort law. In short, the property owner should be liable to the 
[fireman] for his injuries directly resulting from the fire when the 
landowner negligently or intentionally caused the fire. The fireman 
should be owed that same duty of care owed to rescuers and public and 
private employees - a general duty of care owed to all foreseeably 
injured. 
This restructuring would remedy the inequitable treatment suffered by 
firemen and policemen, and at the same time, would further two 
important public policies. Allowing recovery by firemen would serve to 
deter negligence in causing fires and would encourage persons to enter 
this important area of public service which asks man every day to put 
another's safety and welfare before his own. 
7 
The author of Note: Has the Michigan Firefighter's Rule Gone up in 
Smoke? An Analysis of the Wilful and Wanton Exception, 44 Wayne L. Rev. 
1555, 1572-77 (Fall 1998), wrote: 
It is unjust to assign firefighters and police officers, officials who risk 
their lives to protect the public, to a status less than that of every other 
citizen. In essence, the courts are creating individualized duties of care 
based on occupational status, a practice that no Michigan court 
expressly condones. 
Further defects in the policy argument are seen in the inadequacy and 
harmful effects that can result from forcing police officers and firefighters 
to rely solely on workers' compensation. The courts have immunized 
tortfeasors from liability arising from their negligent misconduct by 
limiting safety officials to statutory recovery. This in turn fosters 
negligent behavior. People have no incentive to take proper precautions 
for fire prevention and criminals are afforded a greater degree of 
recklessness. While negligent citizens are being provided immunity, 
injured officers are being deprived adequate recovery as workers' 
compensation is generally inferior to a tort recovery. 
The notion that workers' compensation will best spread the cost of 
officers' injuries to the public as a whole is also a fallacy. Since 
taxpayers provide funds for the worker's compensation benefits that pay 
injured officers, the system requires citizens who act non-negligently to 
pay for the misconduct of other citizens. The firefighter's rule forces the 
individual safety officer and the non-negligent citizen to unfairly shoulder 
this burden. Allowing safety officials to pursue third-party tort claims 
would alleviate this burden and would allow worker's compensation 
insurers the right of subrogation to any proceeds from a third-party 
award, reducing overall taxpayer expenses. 
The analysis is simple. Courts will merely apply general principles of 
negligence in determining whether recovery should be permitted to a 
particular public safety officer. Fundamental concepts of duty, breach, 
causation, and damages will determine liability instead of the current 
8 
complicated and ambiguous exceptions. The trier of fact will consider 
whether "a defendant breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff," and 
whether that breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. Where a plaintiff fails to act reasonably under the 
circumstances, the general principles of comparative negligence will 
diminish the recovery. This system, grounded in familiar legal theories 
in which attorneys and courts are well-versed, will grant the greatest 
assurances of safety, cost prevention, efficiency and justice. Such a 
system will give firefighters and police officers a chance to recover the 
rights and privileges that a poorly conceived and poorly executed rule of 
law has stolen. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As has been articulated in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and in the 
foregoing analysis and examples of case law and commentary treatment of the 
issue, this Court should rule that no part of the Fireman's Rule is or should be 
part of the common law of the State of Utah. There are compelling reasons to 
so rule and no truly satisfactory reason to rule otherwise. 
Alternatively, and if this Court is somehow persuaded that the original 
purpose of the Fireman's Rule - to insulate from liability landowners whose 
negligence causes firefighters to arrive at scenes of fires - for whatever 
reason makes sense, this Court should follow the cases, discussed in 
Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and in this Brief, that limit application of the 
Fireman's Rule to such circumstances only (circumstances that are not 
present in this case). 
9 
This Court should, in any event, rule that the Fireman's Rule does not 
preclude Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claims against Mr. Oldroyd and 
should, accordingly, reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
and instruct the District Court to allow this case to proceed to trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ^/-^"day of September, 2005. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
PETER C. COLLINS, LLC. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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